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Peace prize boosts limorese cause 
The people of East Timor could be looking 
forward to a new phase of concerted 
international action to end Indonesia's 
illegal occupation of their country, 
following the award of the 1996 Nobel 
Peace Prize to two key figures in the 
struggle for self-determination, Bishop 
Carlos Belo and Jose Ramos Horta. 
Non-governmental organisations and church groups embraced the 11 October 
announcement that the prize had gone to 
Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo, Bishop ofDili, and 
Jose Ramos Horta, special representative of the 
Timorese resistance in exile , for their work 
towards a just and peaceful so lution to the. 
conflict in East Tim or. The Vatican said it hoped 
for 'concrete results that respect the rights of 
peoples'. 
The Nobel Committee described Bishop Belo 
as 'the foremost representative of the people 
of East Tim or' : 
At the risk of his own life, he has tried to 
protect his people from infringements by 
those in power. In his efforts to create a just 
settlement based on his people 's right to self-
determination, he has been a constant 
spokesman for non-violence and dialogue 
with the Indonesian authorities. 
Ramos Horta, said the Committee, 
has been the leading international spokesman 
for East Tim or's cause since 1975. Recently he 
has made a significant contribution through 
the 'reconciliation talks' and by working out 
a peace plan for the region. 
Bishop Belo was appointed aposto lic 
administrator of the East Timorese capital in 
1983. He has used his position to protect his 
people and promote the search for peace. In 
July 1994, the Bishop stated that whi le 'the 
church is not a political institution ' it has a 
'moral responsibility to promote justice, peace, 
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love and freedom' . Bishop Belo played a 
moderating role in the June 1995 All-Inclusive 
Intra-East Timorese Dialogue (AIETD) , which 
yielded a consensus statement on the need to 
continue dialogue, take steps to protect human 
rights, build peace and preserve the cultural 
identity of the Timorese people. (Timar Link 
33, June 1995) 
Ramos Horta was foreign minister in the 
short-lived government of independent East 
Timor in 1975. Since the invasion, he has 
lobbied the international community to 
condemn the Indonesian occupation and 
human rights violations. In 1992 he unveiled a 
plan to promote negotiations towards a peaceful 
settlement (Timar Link 36,July 1996). He has 
also played a key role in the AIETD. 
The Indonesian government said it 
'regretted ' the decision. Foreign minister Ali 
Alatas denounced Ramos Horta as a 'political 
adventurist' who does not represent the majority 
of East Timorese. 
Ian Linden, executive director of the Catholic 
Institute for International Relations (CIIR) drew 
attention to the international community's 
responsibility to take up the Nobel Committee 's 
invitation to press for a settlement. He said: 
'This sends a strong signal to the international 
community that it is time to end the long 
betrayal of East Tim or.' 
British foreign office officials said they shared 
'the aspirations of all those who are working 
for a just and comprehensive settlement to the 
question of East Timor' . 
Angie Zelter, one of four activists acquitted 
in July by an English court of conspiracy to 
damage a Hawk jet bound for Indonesia (Timar 
Link 36,July 1996), said: 'This is tremendous 
news. And about time. The new high profile 
that the prize brings should help persuade [UN 
members] to implement all of the UN's 
resolutions and go a long way to getting a 
proper discussion of the peace proposals that 
are on the table .' • 
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1:!,)es on the bigger prize: On hearing of the award 
Bishop Belo is reported to have said that it 
represented the hard work ahead. 
-
Summary 
The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to 
Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos Horta should 
raise the profde of the East Timorese cause, 
helping to step up pressure on the Indonesian 
government. Riots inJakarta and their impli-
cations for Indonesia's political future are 
examined in this issue of Timar Link. We look 
at the frustration over the Tripartite 
Ministerial Talks and the UN Decolonisation 
Committee, and discuss the potential for 
lobbying Ireland as it assumes the EU 
presidency. A leading barrister examines the 
implications of July's surprise acquittal of 
four peace activists in the UK. 
We also discuss the ongoing lack of UN 
human rights monitoring in East Timor, and 
summarise policy debates in Australia, Japan 
and the United States. 
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NEWS ANALYSIS 
Jakarta riots: 
Is Suharto losing 
his grip? 
Riots in Jakarta on 27 July could go down in 
history as a turning point in the fortunes of 
President Suharto's creaking 'New Order'. 
PETER CAREY assesses the implications of 
violence unprecedented in the Indonesian 
capital since 1974. 
0 n 27 July this year Indonesian security forces stormed the Jakarta office of the Indonesian 
Democratic Party (PDI) , leading to perhaps as 
many as seven deaths, 60 'missing', 90 wounded 
and 250 arrests. Among those arrested were 
Moch tar Pakpahan, head of the independent 
Prosperous Indonesian Trades Union (SBSI), 
and Budiman Sudjatmiko, chairman of the 
3,000-strong People's Democratic Party (PRD). 
The government accused those arrested of 
'insurgent' activities, and 'using the PDI conflict' 
to revive the outlawed Indonesian Communist 
Party (PK.I) and to attempt 'an embryonic coup 
d 'etat'. This line did nothing to reassure inter-
national investors: the Jakarta stock exchange 
slumped while the Indonesian currency went 
into free-fall against the US dollar. Nor did it 
convince many of the field-grade army officers 
charged with anti-PDI operations that the heavy-
handed tactics were necessary. In fact, the riots 
have shown up deep splits within the Indonesian 
armed forces, splits which Suharto's increasingly 
frequent reshuffles of senior commanders have 
done little to conceal. 'Where's all the old finesse, 
the delicate manoeuvring? The government is 
using an atomic bomb to kill a fly,' was one senior 
officer's response to the July crackdown (Far 
Eastern Economic R.eview, 8 August 1996) . 
The Indonesian army's willingness to 
underwrite an ageing president (Suharto is now 
75) will be severely tested in the next 18 months, 
a period which will see both general (June 1997) 
and presidential (March 1998) elections and 
heightened debate about Indonesia's political 
future . 
Implications for East Timor 
So where does this leave East Timor? More than 
20 years have passed since its formal 'integration' 
into the Republic ( 17 July 1976), and Suharto 
rules out any possibility of the territory being 
given special status with greater autonomy. Any 
pro-democracy initiative would probably be 
unpopular within the armed forces and Suharto 
cannot afford to alienate their support. As long 
as he remains in power, therefore, new political 
initiatives on East Timor are unlikely. Once 
Indonesia moves into a post-Suharto era, 
however, new possibilities will open up - not 
least because a successor government would be 
able to lay the blame for the East Timor problem 
on the outgoing president. 
Even the continuation of the status quo in 
East Tim or will exact a price, given the political 
uncertainty in Jakarta. In comparison to its size 
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(192 million inhabitants), Indonesia's security 
forces are not large (about 600,000 including 
the paramilitary police) , and its military 
expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic 
product (GDP) is one of the lowest in South 
East Asia. Of the troops available, fewer than 
100,000 are truly dependable. Jakarta maintains 
a force of more than 17,000 in East Timor, 
including a high number of combat regiments. 
A major upheaval in Indonesia proper during 
the coming 18 months to two years would see 
many of these combat units withdrawn to urban 
areas in Java and other key locations. 
Source of inspiration 
Developments in Indonesia proper cannot be 
understood without the East Timor dimension. 
The more radical elements within the Indonesian 
democracy movement draw inspiration from East 
Timor's own struggle for national self-determi-
nation, and resistance leader Xanana Gusmao 
is a hero on many Indonesian university 
campuses. PDI leader, Megawati Sukarnoputri, 
has recently gone out of her way to reassure the 
army that she is not contemplating any change in 
East Timor's status, stating that it is Indonesia's 
' last province'. Nonetheless, there are close 
contacts between the Indonesian democratic 
opposition and the East Timorese students 
(especially members of the Clandestine Civilian 
Resistance Front, thought to number some 3,000 
in East Timor and Indonesia). During the recent 
siege of the PDI headquarters, many East 
Timorese students turned out to show solidarity 
with the PDI party workers' struggle for 
democratic rights. Megawati's political ally, 
Abdurrachman Wahid of the huge Awakening of 
the Ulama movement (NU), is known to favour 
a political settlement which would allow East 
Timor a measure of autonomy. 
Aware of these developments, the army has 
struck hard against the Clandestine Front in 
East Timor, arresting (in June 1995) and 
torturing to death the Front secretary, Pedro 
Nunes (aka Sabalae), and his assistant, Remigio 
Levi da Costa Tilman . So intense has been 
surveillance in the territory that over the past 
year more than 100 Timorese have sought 
asylum by entering Western embassies, the most 
recent incident being on 16August 1996 when 
eight Timorese broke into the French embassy. 
Jakarta has also continued its attempt to portray 
the problems in East Timor as ethnic and 
religious in character (and hence an infringe-
ment of the state ideology, Pancasila), rather 
than a question of national self-determination 
and resistance to foreign occupation. 
The future 
Looking to the immediate future, repression is 
likely to continue in East Timor itself, with every 
effort being made by the security forces to 
manipulate inter-ethnic and inter-religious 
conflicts to their advantage. At the same time, the 
level of surveillance of the Clandestine Front 
both in Timor and inner Indonesia will be 
intensified: 3,000 newly recruited East Timorese 
agents are known to be currently in training in 
a programme set up last year by Suharto's son-
in-law, Special Forces commander Major-
General Prabowo Subianto. Five hundred of 
these will be assigned to keep tabs on East 
Timorese students in Java and Bali. Some agents 
pmvocateurs are already suspected of having been 
involved in the embassy break-ins, and have 
gone with other East Timorese asylum seekers 
to Portugal. Internationally, Indonesian foreign 
minister Ali Alatas will continue to ensure that 
neither the UN-sponsored Tripartite Talks 
between Portugal, Indonesia and the UN 
secretary-general, nor the 'All-Inclusive Intra-
East Timorese Dialogue ' broach issues of 
sovereignty and self-determination. He may well 
be assisted in this by the reluctance of his 
Portuguese counterpart, Jaime Gama, to press 
the East Timorese issue too hard. Even Boutros 
Boutros Ghali's replacement as UN secretary-
general in January 1997 will be unlikely to 
produce new openings here, unless Portugal 
can be persuaded to take the East Timor issue 
back to the UN General Assembly (the last 
General Assembly vote, which Lisbon narrowly 
won, was in 1982). 
Long term change 
In the longer term, the likelihood of a disputed 
succession in Jakarta, the sparseness ofreliable 
troops, and a weariness with the East Timor 
issue in Indonesia may trigger developments. 
For example, some younger field grade officers 
are known to be critical of the way the East 
Timor question has been handled, and tours 
of duty there no longer ensure the same career 
advancement as in the pre-Santa Cruz era. In 
terms oflndonesia's international ambitions as 
a regional power, East Timor is an embarrass-
ment which it would sorely like to get rid of. 
No new government in Jakarta will embark 
lightly on a process of self-determination or 
autonomy for its recalcitrant 'last province'. 
However, it might investigate new initiatives if 
these could be presented as part of a wider 
package oflong-overdue constitutional reforms. 
Such reforms might reintroduce a process 
abandoned in the late 1950s at the time of the 
CIA-backed outer island revolts: namely, 
regional devolution. But the struggle in East 
Tim or is not the< same as that of Aceh or Irian 
Jaya, and constitutional revision may do little 
to help. In that case, Jakarta might do well to 
heed the advice given to the late President 
Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines by Senator 
Paul Laxalt of Nevada in February 1986: 'Mr 
President, the time has come - you must cut, 
and cut clean.' • 
• Peter Carey is a Fellow and Tutor in Modem 
History at Trinity College, Oxford. His study of 
developments in East Timor from 1974 to mid-
1996, East Timor: Third World Colonialism and the 
Struggl,e for National Identity (Conflict Study 
293/ 4), is published by the Research Institute 
for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism on 
I November 1996. Copies, priced £10 ($25 in 
the United States), can be ordered from 
RISCT, 136 Baker Street, London WI IFH, 
UK. Tel: 44 (0) 171 224 2659. Fax: 44 (0) 171 
486 3064. Credit card orders accepted. 
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Going through 
the motion·s? 
Many observers were disappointed with the 
eighth round of Tripartite Talks and the 
hearings of the UN Decolonisation 
Committee on East Timor this summer. 
Some are asking whether either is the best 
forum for dealing with the ongoing 
Indonesian occupation of East Timor. 
The eighth round of the Tripartite Talks on East Timor, between the foreign ministers 
oflndonesia and Portugal, took place in Geneva 
on 27 June under the auspices of the UN 
secretary-general. The communique issued at 
the end of their meetings welcomed the All-
Inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialogue (AIETD) 
held on 19-22 March under UN auspices, and 
'took note positively of the Secretary-General's 
intention to facilitate' another AIETD. They 
agreed to 'proceed with consultations on 
[AIETD proposals] relating to the establishment 
of an East Timorese cultural centre in Dili and 
to the development of human resources in East 
Timor' . (See Timar Link 36.) They agreed to 
hold the ninth round of Tripartite Talks on 21 
December 1996. 
Talks condemned as useless 
The special representative of the Timorese 
resistance abroad, Jose Ramos Horta, criticised 
the results of the meeting and described the 
negotiating process as 'useless'. Suggesting that 
the Indonesian government and the UN 
secretary-general lacked the will to ensure real 
progress, Ramos Horta proposed that talks be 
abandoned in favour of a 'total war' strategy in 
the UN General Assembly. (Publico, 28 June 
1996) 
This idea was echoed by other resistance 
leaders. They suggested that the Portuguese 
government should press for a vote by the 
General Assembly in its 1997 session, calling for 
the International Court of Justice to issue a con-
sultative opinion on the legal status of East Timor. 
In July in New York, the UN Decolonisation 
Committee held its annual session on East 
Timor. Over 30 organisations, including repre-
sen tatives of the resistance and non-govern-
mental organisations (NGOs), read submissions 
to a working paper. Many were deeply critical 
of the Indonesian occupation. The chair of the 
committee, Utula Utuoksama of Papua New 
Guinea, reiterated his past endorsement of the 
Indonesian invasion as 'averting bloodshed and 
civil war in East Tim or'. There was no progress 
on basic issues, provoking Amnesty International 
to accuse the committee of 'going through the 
motions' rather than searching for solutions to 
the problem of colonisation. Sharon Scharfe, 
the Canadian representative of the international 
network Parliamentarians for East Timor, argued 
that unless it could demonstrate progress soon, 
the Decolonisation Committee should hand the 
Timor issue over to the Fourth Committee of 
the UN General Assembly. • 
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EAST TIMOR: lime for change 
Timor, area 7 ,400 square miles, is one of the 
easternmost islands of the Indonesian 
archipelago and lies 300 miles north of 
Australia, its nearest neighbour. The western 
part of the island, formerly a Dutch colony, 
belongs to Indonesia, whereas East Timor was 
for more than 400 years a Portuguese colony. 
In 1974 Portugal decolonised East Timor, 
whose newly formed political parties began 
discussing options for the future - federation 
with Portugal, independence, or integration 
with Indonesia. The Timorese Democratic 
Union (UDT) initially favoured the first 
option but then joined a coalition with the 
nationalist liberation movement, Fretilin, to 
demand independence. A small third party, 
Apodeti, was used as a vehicle for Indonesian 
propaganda in favour of integration. 
On 11 August 1975 the UDT staged a coup 
to pre-empt Indonesian threats to intervene if 
Fretilin came to power. In the ensuing civil 
war, 1,500 people lost their lives. By 
September 1975, however, Fretilin was in 
control of virtually all of Portuguese Tim or, 
following the defection of Timorese colonial 
troops to the liberation movement's side. 
Indonesia, like the United States, was 
worried by the proximity of an independent 
state with radical policies and continued to 
threaten East Timor, despite previous 
assurances that Jakarta would respect the right 
of the East Timorese to independence. In 
September 1975 Indonesia closed West Tunor 
to journalists and on 7 December it launched 
a full-scale invasion of East Timor with the 
knowledge of the United States and the 
encouragement of Australia. East Timor was 
proclaimed the '27th province' of Indonesia. 
The invasion and annexation of East 
Timor has been brutal: up to 200,000 people, 
a third of the population, have died as a result 
of Indonesian rule. But the majority of 
Timorese have not accepted subjugation: 
Indonesia has been unable to eliminate the 
desire of the East Timorese for self-determi-
nation and an armed resistance movement 
still remains in the hills. 
Although the invasion has been 
condemned by successive UN resolutions, 
the international community has done little 
or nothing to implement them, given the 
major economic and geopolitical interests of 
the United States, Japan and particularly 
Australia in the region. Indonesia's crucial 
strategic location and regional status - it has 
the world's fifth largest population, and large 
reserves of oil and other natural resources -
have all encouraged the world to downplay 
East Timor's agony. 
In recent years, however, several events 
have combined to break East Timor's isolation 
and bring its continued occupation to inter-
national attention. In 1989 the Pope visited the 
territory and in 1991 the planned visit of a 
parliamentary delegation from Portugal, still 
considered the administering authority of 
East Timor by the UN, created huge expec-
tations of change. To great disappointment in 
East Timor, the delegation was forced in 
October 1991 to call off its visit. 
On 12November1991 Indonesian troops 
shot and killed up to 300 East Timorese 
civilians during a funeral procession held at 
the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, the East 
Timorese capital, for a victim of repression. 
Witnessed by foreign journalists, the Santa 
Cruz massacre provided indisputable 
evidence of Indonesian atrocities. 
The Santa Cruz massacre has forced 
governments around the world to criticise 
Indonesia's brutality, injecting new impetus 
into diplomatic efforts to bring about a 
solution to East Timor's suffering. Since 1983 
the UN Secretary-General has been entrusted 
with the achievement of a settlement to the 
dispute; and with the post-Cold War era 
providing a new intematlonal climate for nego-
tiations, Indonesia faces increased presmlre to 
reach a solution with Portugal and the East 
Timorese under the auspices of the UN. 
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BAe acquittal: the legal fallout 
The surprise acquittal in July of the women 
peace activists who had admitted 
damaging a British Aerospace jet destined 
for Indonesia (see Timar Link 36, July 
1996) vindicated the women's 
commitment and methods. But to what 
extent does the verdict set a precedent? 
And is there now a greater threat to the 
right to trial by jury in some cases in 
Britain? BILL BOWRING examines the 
possible impact of the decision on a jury 
system under increasing attack from police 
and government and assesses the 
implications for campaigns against the 
arms trade. 
On 30 July 1996 a jury at Liverpool Crown Court, after retiring for only five hours, 
acquitted four women. Three of them, Lotta 
Kronlid, Andrea Needham, and Joanna Wilson 
had admitted causing criminal damage -
estimated at £1.5 million - to a British Aerospace 
Hawk fighter plane. All four, including Angie 
Zelter, had admitted conspiring to cause damage 
at the British Aerospace plant at Warton, near 
Preston, UK. 
Historical precedents 
This was by no means the first time that a jury has 
acquitted defendants whose guilt seemed beyond 
doubt. For example, in 1985 an Old Bailey jury 
acquitted Clive Ponting, a senior civil servant 
who had clearly breached section 2 of the then 
Official Secrets Act 1911 (since replaced) by 
supplying classified information to an MP. 
That jury followed the splendid precedent of 
the London jury which, in 1670, refused to 
convict the two Quakers William Penn and 
William Mead of holding a seditious assembly. 
Sentenced to prison by the trial judge for their 
temerity in acquitting the defendants, the jurors 
challenged their punishment by using the 
venerable writ of Habeas Corpus. In another 
case, known as Bushell 's Case, the lord chief 
justice Sir Robert Vaughan decided that a jury is 
en titled to act according to its own conscience 
and appreciation of the evidence, irrespective of 
judicial direction or explanation. The jurors 
were released. Ever since then it has been a 
cornerstone of English constitutional law that 
the jury is independent, and can do justice, 
whatever the law may be. No British government 
has sought to overturn the precedent set in 
Bushell's Case. What successive governments 
have done is to restrict the class of cases in which 
a defendant is entitled to jury trial: had Penn 
and Mead been tried today, they would in all 
probability have been tried by magistrates. 
The women's defence 
The Warton women's case, which lasted seven 
days, was particularly controversial because it 
concerned the sale of weapons to the regime of 
General Suharto in Indonesia. This sale, of 24 
Hawks for the sum of £500 million , was 
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concluded in 1993 in accordance with export 
licences granted by the British government. 
Harry Haryono, the Indonesian minister 
counsellor at the Indonesian embassy in London, 
insisted that the sale satisfied the condition set 
by the two parties - that the Indonesian 
government had never and would never use the 
Hawks to suppress the people of East Timor. 
Nevertheless, the background to the case was 
evidence from Amnesty International and others 
that during the past two decades, since Indonesia 
invaded the former Portuguese colony of East 
Timor in 1975, some 200,000 out of a total 
population of 600 ,000 have died under 
Indonesian rule. In a recent ruling, the Inter-
national Court of Justice at the Hague reiterated 
that the right of the people of East Tim or to self-
determination following the end of colonial rule 
has been and is still being violated by Indonesia. 
The Warton women admitted that they had 
caused the damage. Indeed, they left a 15-minute 
video in the cockpit of the damaged jet, in which 
they explained their motivation - that they had 
good reason to fear that the Hawks would be 
used as part of Indonesia's genocide of the 
people of East Timor. Their defence, therefore, 
was straightforward. They argued that they had 
a lawful excuse for their actions - namely that, in 
accordance with section 3 of the Criminal Law 
Act 1967, they were entitled to use such force 
as was reasonable in the circumstances in order 
to prevent the commission ofa crime. 
Prevention of genocide 
Genocide is an international crime pursuant to 
the Genocide Convention 1948, and the United 
Kingdom has enacted the Genocide Act 1969 
which makes it an offence for a person of any 
nationality in any part of the world to commit any 
of the acts falling within the definition of 
genocide in the Convention, including acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious 
group, by, for example, killing them. This 
offence is punishable, in the case of the killing 
of any person, by life imprisonment. 
The women were therefore obliged to confirm 
their belief that the Hawk would be used for the 
purpose of this crime. Usually, the women's 
genuine belief would be enough for the purpose 
of their defence. But in this case the women 
were making allegations against a foreign state 
with which Britain has trading relations. The 
jury might not consider their actions reasonable 
iftheir belief was unjustified. That was why the 
judge permitted them to call so much evidence 
as to the probable use of the Hawk by Indonesia. 
Witnesses included refugees from East Timor, 
journalist John Pilger, whose articles in the New 
Statesman and Society have been exemplary in 
their principled exposure of the crimes of the 
Indonesian government, and campaigner 
Carmel Budiardjo, whose organisation TAPOL 
has consistently exposed human rights abuses 
in Indonesia and East Timor. Their evidence 
was to the effect that the Hawk would be used 
against the people of East Tim or. 
There was a further obstacle to acquittal. The 
women's use of force could only be reasonable 
in the circumstances if commission of a crime 
was imminent, and there was no other way of 
preventing it. The defence drew a parallel with 
causing criminal damage to vehicle tyres, in 
order to stop an IRA bomb on its way to 
Manchester, which would not be a crime if there 
was no time to call the police. 
The women had therefore been careful, for 
some months before their attack on the jet, to 
take all possible steps to prevent the Hawk from 
being sent to Indonesia. All this was contained 
in their video. For example, they had asked the 
police to bring charges of genocide against 
employees of BAe and others, and had also 
sought an injunction to stop the sale. These 
attempts were unsuccessful. Delivery of the jet 
was due to take place at the end of January. So 
they told the jury that there was nothing at all 
they could do by 29 January to prevent the 
commission of the crime of genocide, other than 
to disable the jet. 
'Beating swords into ploughshares' 
The defence was particularly effective because 
only one of the women, Joanna Wilson, was 
represented by a barrister while the other three 
defended themselves. In this way they were able 
to ensure that their case was fully presented to 
the jury both in terms of the law and in terms of 
the commitment and sincerity of the women 
themselves. The women were all members of 
the Christian peace group Seeds of Hope, part 
of the Ploughshares Movement. It is a principle 
of their movement that in order to follow the 
biblical injunction to 'beat swords into 
ploughshares' they always use peaceful means 
and always take responsibility for their actions. 
Throughout the trial the courtroom was packed 
with the women's supporters, including many 
nuns and priests, and mass was celebrated 
outside the court while the jury deliberated. 
Wider significance 
There can be no doubt that all these factors 
helped to secure the women's acquittal. But it 
cannot be said that any new legal precedent has 
been created. Juries do not give reasons, and 
no one other than the jurors knows what was 
discussed during their five-hour deliberations. It 
is likely, however, that they were persuaded by 
the defence arguments that a crime under 
British and international law was imminent. 
Juries do not often exercise their right to acquit 
in the face of judicial rulings or evidence of guilt, 
and cases such as Clive Ponting's have not Jed to 
the commission of floods of similar offences. It 
is unlikely that this case will lead to any further 
restriction of the right to trial by jury - and, of 
course, it has once again been demonstrated 
that the jury system is one of the most important 
guarantors of civil liberties, as well as a deterrent 
to arbitrary and unjust rule. Nevertheless, it must 
be emphasised that the four women themselves 
not only spent the whole period before their 
trial on remand at 'grisly' Risley, but fully 
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expected that they would be convicted and 
would receive long sentences of imprisonment. 
What is the significance of this case? First, it 
demonstrates that commitment, sincerity and 
careful planning are essential components of 
any popular protest which intends to break the 
law. It also shows that an issue such as the gross 
violations of human rights, including genocide, 
Lobbying the 
Irish Presidency 
of the EU 
On 1 July, Ireland assumed a six-month 
presidency of the European Union (EU), the 
world's wealthiest trading block. Sean 
Steele, of the East Timor Ireland Solidarity 
Campaign (ETISC), examines this unique 
opportunity to put East Timor at the top of 
the EU agenda in its dealings with 
Indonesia. 
In the past four years, the issue of East Timor has become well known in Ireland. Many Irish 
people see a parallel between East Timor's history 
and their own: a small country colonised by its 
larger neighbour, resulting in cultural destruction 
and dispossession. The parallels are striking: East 
Timor has lost one-third of its population as a 
result of Indonesian occupation. More than 1 
million Irish people died as a direct result of 
colonial economic policies during the 'Great 
Famine' of 1845-49. Thousands of people from 
all over Ireland have written to their government 
asking it to help East Timor. Support has come 
from all sections of the population: school groups, 
community associations, the unemployed, trades 
unions and all political parties. 
Public pressure has affected foreign policy. 
The Irish government has repeatedly stated that 
it supports the right of the East Timorese to self-
determination; it has called for an arms embargo 
against Indonesia because of its human rights 
abuses and flouting of UN resolutions . Irish 
government officials continually raise the issue 
wi th Indonesian officials. In New York last 
November, Irish foreign minister Dick Spring 
walked out of a meeting with his Indonesian 
counterpart, Ali Alatas, after Alatas refused to 
discuss East Timor. The Indonesian foreign 
minister also criticised an article Spring had 
penned in the Irish Times stating the Irish 
government 's commitment to using its EU 
presidency to work for a just solution for East 
Timor. Alatas late r described the article as 
'tantamount to a declaration of war'. 
Priority issue for Ireland 
At the Bangkok EU-Asia summit (ASEM) in 
March 1996, Irish prime minister John Bruton 
raised the question of East Tim or in a meeting 
with President Suharto. Irish diplomats have 
also committed themselves to raising East Tim or 
issues at 'working group ' level within the 
European Union. 
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suffered by the people of East Timor, is capable 
of exciting public interest and sympathy. • 
• Bill Bowring is a Barrister and Lecturer in Law 
at the University of Essex. The author wishes to 
thank defence barrister Vera Baird of Tooks 
Court Chambers for commenting on this 
article; any mistakes are his own. 
Irish foreign minisff!r Dick spring: East Timar a priority 
issue for the Irish presidency of the European Union. 
At the summit of EU foreign ministers in 
Tralee, County Kerry, in September 1996, Spring 
took time off to meet with the East Timor Ireland 
Solidarity Campaign (ETISC) and said that East 
Timor was 'a priority issue' for the Irish 
presidency of the European Union. Other EU 
foreign ministers were reminded of East Timor 
when they passed an ETISC vigil outside the 
conference centre. 
Irish initiatives wanted 
ETISC wants the Irish government to undertake 
a number of initiatives during its EU presidency. 
First, ETISC wants it to push for a UN human 
rights office to be opened in the East Timorese 
capital ofDili. In April 1996 the UN Commission 
on Human Rights mandated a UN human rights 
office; this has not yet been established. When 
and if it is opened it will be inadequate for two 
reasons: it will be located in Jakarta, 1,500 miles 
(2,400 kilometres) from Timor and therefore 
from the site of the violations it is supposed to 
monitor; and its very location inJakarta implies 
an acceptance of Indonesian sovereignty over 
East Timor. This is unacceptable to those who 
believe in international law. Any move to open 
an office in Dili would, of course, be resisted by 
the government of Indonesia, yet it can be 
achieved if the Irish government holds to its 
position. 
There should be an EU or broader interna-
tional inquiry into the 21-year Indonesian 
occupation. This should take testimonies from 
East Timorese and catalogue past atrocities and 
crimes. It is doubtful if a commission of inquiry 
would be allowed into either Indonesia or East 
Timor, but there are enough East Timorese in 
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Portugal , Australia and Macao to suffice. The 
conclusions h" such a commission \l'ould serve as 
the definitive record on Indonesian behaviour. 
Supporters of General Suharto, both inside and 
outside the European Union , would then be 
unable to dismiss atrocities as 'allegations'. The 
other advantage would be that those Indonesian 
officers who have committed crimes against 
humanity in East Timor could be held 
accountable and those who have had no 
involvement would be cleared.* 
It is also important for Ireland to follow up 
on its June 1996 pledge, made to the special rep-
resentative of the East Timor resistance , Jose 
Ramos Horta, to provide support for the 
Tripartite Talks and the AB-Inclusive Intra-East 
Timorese Dialogue which take place under UN 
auspices. 
At present, President Suharto has the support 
of the larger EU states, namely those that are 
weapons producers. There are now only two 
countries committed to East Timor in the EU: 
Portugal and Ireland. The Irish presidency could 
oversee the establishment of a pro-East Timor 
'block' from countries such as Greece and the 
Scandinavian countries: a counter-weight to 
those that put business deals with one of the 
world's most corrupt and violent regimes above 
respect for the principles of international law, 
human rights and justice. Such a move is an 
imperative. Portuguese concerns regarding East 
Timor are dismissed because of their colonial 
history in the territory. Ireland, which was never 
a colonial power, is in a perfect position to 
challenge Indonesian colonial policies in East 
Timor. Any charges of neo-colonialism ring 
hollow when levelled against Ireland. An added 
advantage is that Ireland has played a very 
honourable role in the cause of world peace. 
There is no doubt that a solution can be found 
to the Timor conflict. But much more work is 
needed. More outside pressure is needed to 
complement the work of the pro-democracy 
movement inside Indonesia. With the recent 
death of his wife, Suharto is in an increasingly 
isolated position. Criticism of the regime's 
violence, nepotism and corruption now comes 
even from the business community, both inside 
and outside Indonesia. Throughout Europe, 
the East Timor issue is gaining public awareness 
as ordinary citizens rally to the cause that their 
diplomats and governments have so disgrace-
fully neglected. • 
* This issue will be addressed in detail at the 
conference of the International Platform of 
Jurists for East Timor (IPJET) in Dublin on 
8-10November1996. 
-----
:What you can do 
ETISC is asking all concerned with East 
Timor's plight to write to the Irish foreign 
minister mging him to continue his efforts 
and to congratulate him on his work so far. 
He can be contacted at: 
Mr Dick Spring, Minister for Foreign Affaln, 
Deparbnent of Foreign Affairs, 80 St.,._,, 
Green, Dublin 2, Ireland. Fax: 353 1478 1484 
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HUMAN RIGHTS 
Detentions continue 
According to the international secretariat of the Organisation \Iondiale Contre la 
Torture (World Organisation Against Torture), 
many of the approximately 165 people detained 
in the wake of the Baucau riots on 10-11 June 
have still not been released. Grave concern has 
been expressed for their well-being. 
The East Timor Human Rights Centre 
(ETHRC)in Melbourne has reported that 21 
vouths were detained by Indonesian army forces 
in the Ermera and Bobonaro regions of East 
Tim or on 14, 15 and 22 July. The detainees 
include Matias da Cunha (28) , Delfonso de Deus 
(16), Luis Tilma (19), Pedro Borges (18) and 
Miguel Maia Mau Soco (34) . All are believed to 
be at risk of torture and ill-treatment. 
Also according to the ETHRC, on 2 August 
Indonesian security forces personnel arrested 
Teresa de Fatima (39) and her four children in 
the village of Hatuquessi in Liquica district. 
There is serious concern for their well-being. 
De Fatima is the wife of Julio 'Maureha', a 
commander of the Timorese resistance forces 
Falantil, who is alleged to have been involved in 
the killing of an Indonesian army captain in the 
village of Acumano on 27 July. 
Lack of monitoring 
While such grave violations of human rights 
continue, there has been no apparent progress 
on the implementation of the provisions for an 
on-site human rights presence set out in the 
Statement on East Timor, by the Chair of the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 
on 19 April 1996. 
Al recommendations 
In a March 1996 briefing on the visit to East 
Timor and Indonesia of the UN high commis-
sioner on human rights, Amnesty International 
noted that the effectiveness of a UN human 
rights office in Jakarta would depend on a 
number of conditions being met. These include: 
• the office should have the authority to receive 
information from all available sources 
• the office should have the authority to issue 
regular reports on its findings ... these reports 
should be made available to the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights 
• the office should have the authority to advise 
the Indonesian Government on ways and 
means to improve the human rights situation 
in Indonesia and East Timor 
• the office should be staffed by independent 
human rights experts 
• staff of the office must have full and 
unimpeded access to all areas of Indonesia 
and East Timor 
• the office should not preclude initiatives of 
other United Nations human rights experts 
and mechanisms. 
It is important for the international community 
to recall these basic prerequisites for effectively 
promoting human rights in East Timor. • 
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AUSTRALIA 
PM in Indonesia and Japan 
The visit of Prime Minister John Howard to 
Indonesia on 17-18 September highlighted the 
continuity of Australian policy despite the recent 
change of government in Canberra. Howard 
referred to East Timor in his conversations with 
Indonesian officials but did not broach the issue 
of repression against pro-democracy activists in 
Indonesia. A week earlier Deputy Prime Minister 
Tim Fischer returned from Jakarta cautioning 
against raising human rights issues 'out of 
context'. In late September John McCarthy, 
Australia ' s new ambassador to Indonesia, 
explained: 'When there is a contravention of 
basic human rights, we have to make our point 
of view clear. But it is often more effective to do 
it in a way that doesn't[ .. . ] embarrass the other 
government publicly.' These statements were 
made against the backdrop of ongoing military 
training cooperation between the two countries' 
armed forces, the signing of a final agreement on 
maritime boundaries and the continued 
expansion of commercial ties. 
During his subsequent visit to Japan, Howard 
heard from parliamentarians opposed to such 
a business-as-usual policy. The supra-partisan 
Diet Members ' Forum on East Timor wrote to 
the prime ministers of Australia and Japan 
calling on both governments to take a more 
active approach to peacemaking: 
It is essential that determined efforts be made 
to bring the Indonesian government together 
[ . .. ] with the Resistance in East Timor. [ .. . ] 
The countries ideally positioned to bring the 
parties together are Australia [ ... ] and Japan. 
UNITED STATES 
New arms sales likely 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Affairs, 
Winston Lord, testified before the EastAsia Sub-
committee of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on 18 September that he and other 
senior US officials regularly raise the issues of 
human rights and East Timor with the 
Indonesian government. With regard to 
President Bill Clinton 's talks with President 
Suharto at the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Forum (APEC) in November, Lord 
said he was 'sure that the general theme about 
reaching our full potential, depending on 
improvement in human rights, including East 
Timor, would be introduced'. 
The Clinton administration is favourably 
considering the sale of nine F-16 fighter jets to 
Indonesia. 'This is not a new weapons system', 
explained Lord: 
it was a small number, and [ ... ] consistent 
with Indonesia's responsible regional and 
international behaviour. A regionally 
respected armed forces [ ... ] that trains and 
operates in a non-threatening manner is an 
important contributor to regional stability. • 
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Message from the 
Canadian bishops 
The Canadian Catholic Bishops' 
Conference issued the following statement 
in Ottawa on 18 July 1996: 
0 n the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the occupation of East Timor by Indonesia, the 
members of the Episcopal Commission for Social 
Affairs of the Canadian Conference of Catholic 
Bishops wish to express their solidarity and their 
support to the people of East Timor who are 
demanding recognition of their basic human 
rights. [ ... ] 
The Government oflndonesia (which, since 
1992, has timidly consented to discussions) 
hesitates again to advance in negotiations with 
representatives of the people of East Timor. 
Aware of the complexity of these diplomatic 
discussions, we once again invite the Canadian 
government to manifest its support for a 
negotiated solution. More particularly, we 
request that the Government of Canada: 
• exercise political, diplomatic, commercial and 
economic pressure at the multilateral and 
bilateral levels in order to encourage the 
Indonesian authorities to opt for a clear 
political solution to the conflict and to engage 
in good faith negotiations with representa-
tives of the people of East Tim or; 
• direct Canadian foreign aid via non-govern-
mental organisations; 
• demand the retreat of Indonesian security 
forces from East Timor; 
• stop issuing licenses for the export of military 
equipment and technology to Indonesia; 
• denounce and condemn the violations of 
human rights exercised by the Indonesian 
military; 
• demand that the government of Indonesia 
cease the repression that has already created 
too many victims. [ ... ] 
We wish to emphasize the critical pastoral role 
and ministry of Bishop Belo and the people of his 
diocese who denounce the military abuses and 
who work to make negotiations progress towards 
the identification of a solution respectful of the 
rights of the people of East Timor. We applaud 
their efforts and what they have accomplished, 
often amid difficult conditions, and we assure 
them of our solidarity and our prayers. 
We invite the members of Canadian Christian 
communities to become aware of the situation, 
to pressure their Members of Parliament to 
demand that the Canadian Government ener-
getically intervene with the Indonesian 
authorities. We also invite them to join us in 
prayer for our brothers and sisters of the diocese 
of Dili, who, inspired by the message of peace 
and justice willed to us by Jesus, are working for 
the building of a more just and fraternal world. 
Franrois Thibodeau, cjm, Bishop of Edmundston, 
Chairman, Episcopal Commission for Social Affairs, 
Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops 
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None shall make 
them afraid 
Excerpts from the report of a visit to East 
Timor by an ecumenical delegation 
representing the World Council of 
Churches (WCC) and the Christian 
Conference of Asia (CCA), from 26 to 29 
June 1996. 
A. Introduction 
1. At the invitation of the Christian Church of 
East Timor (GKTT) and with the assistance of 
the Communion of Churches in Indonesia 
(PGI/CCI), an ecumenical team visited East 
Timor [ ... ]In September 1995, the GKTT was 
received into the membership of the wee, and 
so the visit of 1996 was to a member church 
which was anxious to demonstrate its concern 
not simply to receive the support of the world 
body but itself to participate in the life of the 
wider family of Christ giving its support to those 
who needed it[ .. . ] 
3. The team sought to convey the continuing 
concern of Christians elsewhere for the people 
and churches of East Timor, and uied to deepen 
their understanding of the extremely 
complicated situation in this former Portuguese 
colony. They attempted in particular to discern 
ways in which their two sponsoring organisa-
tions should respond to the changing situation 
in East Timor. 
4. The visit took place soon after a number of 
incidents had occurred, for example that on 7 
and 8 June in the vicinity of Baucau involving 
damage to a mosque and the killing of a soldier 
which had led to the detention of some 79 young 
people which exemplified the volatility of the 
region. The visit took place immediately before 
the four-yearly meeting of the Synod of the 
GKTT. 
5. Immediately following its visit to East Timor 
the team was able to present its most immediate 
reflections at a meeting with the General 
Moderator and the General Secretary of the PGI 
inJakarta [ ... ] 
B. Three Reflections on the Life of 
the Churches 
The mission of the GKIT 
8. The team was delighted to note the growth of 
the GKTT and to visit it as a new member church 
of the WCC. The group was pleased to see two 
newly built churches, one in Dili and one in 
Baucau, as well as the new headquarters building 
of the GKTT. 
9. The GKTT in its common life is a witness to 
the unity of all God's people as it brings together 
Christian s from a wide diversity of ethnic 
backgrounds from different parts of the Republic 
of Indonesia. 
10. At the same time, it recognises that it has a 
special mission to the Timorese people and 
special responsibilities to undertake advocacy 
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for the needs and aspirations, and to minister to 
the distress and fear under which many of them 
live. 
The need for Christian unity 
11. Given the various threats to the community 
in East Timor, it is of the highest importance 
that every opportunity be grasped, and even 
created, for Catholic and Protestants to work 
together with one another, not allowing 
incidents or processes to drive a wedge between 
the churches. The team received clear evidence 
that certain political interests were eager to do 
just that. 
From Political to lnter-Religi.ous Conflict 
12. From political to inter-religious conflict: it was 
suggested to the team that agencies in Indonesia 
under Islamic influence were seeking to relocate 
the conflict in East Timor, turning it from a 
dispute between political parties and positions 
into an inter-religious issue, sometimes Catholic 
v Protestant, but more importantly Christian v 
Muslim, putting the Pancasila principle at risk. 
This was a new emphasis not so obviously to be 
seen or witnessed in earlier visits. 
C. Three Reflections on the 
Socio-economic Situation 
Human rights 
13. Despite systematic and persistent efforts by 
the Indonesian government to silence the voice 
of the international community on human rights 
violations in East Timor, the issue remains high 
on the agenda of inter-governmental organisa-
tions like the United Nations and the European 
Community. In a statement issued during the 
recently concluded 1996 session of the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights, Mr 
Ayala Lasso, the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights , mentioned the grave human rights 
violations taking place in the territory, calling 
upon the Indonesian government to take action 
to improve the situation. 
14. The United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights is presently engaged in negotiations with 
the Indonesian government for the opening of 
a human rights office in Jakarta. The High Com-
missioner wants his team of monitors to be able 
to visit East Timor as often as is necessary and to 
make frequent reports to him on the situation 
there. 
15. The necessity of the High Commissioner's 
request became clear to the delegation when it 
spoke to a number of East Timorese and heard 
stories of torture, illegal detentions, disappear-
ances, and unlawful killings, and was confirmed 
in the documentation provided by the Joint 
Committee for the Defence of the East Timorese. 
Repression started by the Indonesian security 
forces in 1975 goes on unabated despite outward 
appearances of calm and normalcy. The black-
hooded Ninja gangs of 1995 have disappeared 
only to be replaced by unidentified para-military 
groups that operate with complete impunity, 
spreading fear, terror and havoc particularly in 
rural areas. 
16. The military apparently have no control over 
the activities of these groups which considerably 
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add to a climate of fear amongst the people. 
Reports of misbehaviour bv the lower ranks of 
the military particularly in their dealings with 
youth are comrl}on. Most of the repression takes 
place in the context of counter-insurgencv 
measures carried out on the pretext of 
maintaining national security and fighting the 
armed resistance to Indonesian forces. 
17. In the judgement of Bishop Belo, in such 
circumstances it is crucial that international 
solidarity work in support of the East Timorese 
struggle continue. 
Trans-migration 
18. The team was told that the trans-migration 
policy of the Indonesian government forms part 
of its overall efforts to integrate and develop the 
province. Under this policy, large numbers of 
Indonesians from other islands have been 
encouraged to settle in East Tim or. Some of the 
migrants have brought their skills and have 
contributed to the development effort . In 
comparison to the local people, most of these 
migrants are well-equipped and have little or no 
difficulty in finding jobs. But for local people 
scarcity of employment opportunities in the 
province results in frustration and hostility 
towards the migrants. 
19. Whilst the team was staying in the Republic 
publicity was given in the daily papers to a 
statement of government opinion which denied 
the validity of the concept of indigenous people, 
all peoples being citizens of the Republic and 
only that. Not surprisingly, therefore, many East 
Timorese see in the present migrant policy of the 
government a deliberate attempt to destroy the 
indigenous culture and future of the Timorese 
people as a distinct ethnic group in their own 
lands. 
20. The fact that the migrants come from 
different cultural and religious backgrounds has 
further aggravated the situation. Growing 
religious and ethnic tensions particularly 
amongst the youth have resulted in increasing 
conflicts between the indigenous people (Putrah 
daerah) and migrants (Pendatong). The climate 
of suspicion, fear and hatred generated by this 
has seriously hampered development efforts. 
21. Whilst recognising that the chi ldren of 
migrants who know no other home than East 
Timor should not be discriminated against, there 
is an urgent need to review the present migration 
trends and patterns . Unless this task is 
undertaken on an urgent basis, there is 
likelihood of present tensions building up into 
a major conflagration which can only add to the 
difficulties of the East Timor situation. 
Development 
22. To create confidence in its development 
programmes, the government needs to be 
sensitive to the socio-cultural background of the 
people. 
23. The team continues to affirm that economic 
development without the ability of the Timorese 
people to participate fully in the making of the 
decisions which will shape their future lives is a 
wholly inadequate policy for East Timor. 
However, they now notice that because of this, 
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even de,·elopment programmes themsel\'es are 
suffering since it becomes increasingh· difficult 
to motr;ate people to take responsibilitv for these 
activities in an atmosphere where there is a Yery 
high le\'el of corrosive suspicion and fear. In 
these circumstances, development ceases to be 
de\'elopment as communities lapse into 
dependency upon a wide variety of development-
agencY handouts. 
24. This leads the group to believe that only as 
a culture of hope, rather than one of fear, is 
fostered is there any chance of development 
programmes having any success. An expectation 
of consistent progress towards full participation 
in decision-making, uninterrupted by arbitrary 
military intervention , is a necessary precondi-
tion to enable development programmes 
themsel\'es to be able to achieve their goals, and 
thus to meet the needs of empowering the local 
people to deploy their energies and talents to 
create their own future in the context of a multi-
cultural, multi-religious society which guarantees 
justice to all its members. 
Recommendations 
25. Ecumenical solidarity. The team discerns 
the unique potential of the churches in East 
Timor for becoming instruments of hope, unity, 
and justice for the people of East Tim or. It is 
important for the international ecumenical 
community to be with them and to strengthen 
the bonds of ecumenical fellowship that have 
been built over the past several years. • 
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Comment: 
Eastlimor 
-The 
continuing 
betrayal 
'Bkssed are those who work for justice. 
The peopk of East Tim or are working for justice, 
Jightingfor their rights and they are b/,essed [. .. ] 
God is raising up peopk everywhere to wal,k 
alongside I he East Timorese [ ... ]In 1989 Bishop 
Belo wrote that the world has forgotten East Timar. 
Let us show that it is not true. ' 
Monsignor Aloisius Nobuo Soma 
retired Bishop ofNagoya,Japan,June 1994 
The consequences of Indonesia's illegal occupation of East Timor in 1975 were 
graphically illustrated in 1991 when the 12 
November massacre of about 250 Timorese 
ci\'ilians bv Indonesian securitv forces in Santa 
Cnu, was shown on television screens across the 
" 'orld. Public awareness of East Timor's struggle 
for justice has grown as a result, but a business as 
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What the international community should demand 
Human rights 
1. Call for the unconditional release of 
prisoners detained for their political views 
and for the immediate cessation of arbitrary 
arrest, torture and other violations of 
international human rights Jaw by security 
forces in East Timor. 
2. Encourage the Indonesian government to 
launch a proper, impartial inquiry into past 
human rights violations, especially the Santa 
Cruz Massacre, in order to resolve the 
circumstances surrounding extrajudicial 
executions and disappearances. 
Compensation should be accorded to 
families of victims. 
3. Support rigorous, impartial on-site human 
rights monitoring by the United Nations and 
press for regular, unhindered access to East 
Timor by non-governmental human rights 
organisations. 
4. Press for an immediate reduction of 
Indonesian troops deployed in East Timor, 
and their eventual withdrawal in the context 
of a comprehensive settlement. 
usual approach by Asian and western 
governments reinforces the Indonesian 
government's claim to absolute sovereignty over 
EastTimor. 
This Comment documents the practices of the 
players who are able to influence East Timor's 
future, including the Timorese resistance, the 
Indonesian government, Asian and Western 
governments, the United Nations, the Catholic 
church and other civil society organisations. It 
shows in graphic detail how, despite their public 
pronouncements in favour of human rights and 
decolonisation, many governments have 
rewarded Jakarta 's behaviour - and betrayed 
East Timor - by boosting trade, aid and even 
arms sales to Indonesia. 
The Comment argues that there will be no 
immediate reduction in East Timor's suffering 
until the Indonesian government alters its 
policy: it must recognise the rights of the East 
Timorese under international law and enter 
into the serious dialogue required to forge a 
comprehensive settlement. The booklet outlines 
how the international community could 
encourage such a policy shift in Jakarta, through 
the Tripartite Talks and the All-Inclusive Intra-
East Timorese Dialogue under United Nations 
auspices, in the UN Commission on Human 
Rights and in other fora . It also discusses 
confidence-building measures, such as on-site 
verification of human rights by the UN and 
independent human rights non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), which could help reduce 
suffering, defuse tensions and lay foundations 
for peace. It concludes that international civil 
society organisations - NGOs, churches and 
solidarity organisations - could play an 
important role in promoting a breakthrough 
Negotiations 
5. Support the Tripartite Talks under the aegis 
of the UN secretary-general, while pressing 
for substantial progress towards a just, and 
comprehensive settlement, in line with 
international law and the will of the Timorese 
people. 
6. Encourage the parties seriously to consider 
the peace plan put forward by the National 
Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) as 
a framework for resolving the conflict. 
7. Support the continuation of the All-Inclusive 
Intra-East Timorese Dialogue under UN 
auspices, while pressing for the inclusion of 
all recognised East Timorese leaders, 
including Xanana Gusmao, in the talks. 
Broader relations 
8. Provide development assistance to East 
Timor through local church and non-
governmental organisations, rather than 
through governmental agencies. 
9. Restrict arms sales to Indonesia and review 
broader aid, trade, investment and military 
cooperation relations if there is no 
meaningful movement forward by the 
government of Indonesia on the question of 
EastTimor. 
on East Timor, primarily by increasing public 
pressure for change. The Comment puts forward 
policy recommendations for the international 
community (above) . • 
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